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Government Oil P011cy qnn Its Effect
On Do~estic & Offshore 011 Pronuct1.~n
To date the petroleum industry is second only to the
Department of Defense ln its stimulation of ocean technology.
By the end of 1968, American petroleum companies had invested
over 13 billion dollars on the cont inental shelves of t'le
United States. The development of submersibles, man in the
sea, instruments, seismic surveys, mapping 9,nQ charting, ~nd
development of ocean structures and engine~ring have all bepn
profoundly effected by this massive injection of capit~l.
There are about 16,000 companies in the United Stqtes thl'lt qre
either exploring or producing petroleum. Oo~anologyc~l's the
petroleum industry the only growth industry t n thp. '1cecm 118:,:,'{et
1
today. Furthermore, this rapid expansion into the o oea.ns hq.s
had important ramificatlons for the d evel.o pmen t of Yiqbl e
legal regimes for the world's oceans a.s well as dorn8stlc boundqr-
ies, and has, through pollution, the potential to r-ut n tmurJrtR.nt
sources of protein :~'or the human race. It is obviously of interest,
therefore, to consider policies which affect offshore oil
exploration and development. This paper is c0nfined to anRl-
yzing three such economic policies in ter~s of their effects
on the industry, their costs, and alterng,tives. F1.rst, the in-
dustry and its role in the demand and consu~ptlon o~ energy
nee~ to be summarized.
An Overview of Petroleum in the U.S.
The Petroleum industry is somewhat arbitrarily div1.ded
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into the majors, the top thirty vertic~lly int~grRted 0\1
compani es , and the independents, wht ch incl ude lqrge 1Y1Ul t 1-
million dollar corporations, as well as small pr0ducers, ~e-
fin8rs, and distributors. In 1970, seven of the top twenty
U.J. industrial corporations by sales, and nine of the twenty
largest by assets were oil companies. Gross assets ]~ the seven
largest oil companies amounted to 52.3 billion dollars. P~ofits
of dtandard Oil (New Jersey) which by assets is the largest
corporation in the w,)rld, were equal to the combined profi ts
2
of General Motors and Ford.
The size of the majors, however, conceals the fqct thRt
the independents have traditionally been respostble fo~ i~por-
tant innovations and discoveries tn the oil business, PRrtl~u-
larly in exploration and production. For this reason an t~por-
tant interrelationship exists between the maiors and indeuen-
dents. As the oil industry is now concentrating on the ~~re
lucrative Offshore fields, this pa'~tern is being disturbed.
A small independent cannot afford, risk, or aqu1re the tre~end-
aus amounts of capital required for these operati~ns. The 1Y191ors
are therefore becoming increasingly important in explorRtinn
and production.
Domestic oil companies also have the world's largest
market. The United States consumes 35% of the crune 011 p~oduced
in the world, compared to Europe which uses zgt and the U.S.S.q.
which uses only 12%. We consume 62% of the wor1d's natur9' ~9S,
compared to ~urope which uses 9%, and the U.S.S.H wht ch uses
14,i.3 Th e development of the nat ur-aL gas industry t n the Unt t.ed
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or a reserve/producti~n reti) of 10.7/1. If by 1977 thorp we~p
no ch~nges ln our state of technology, no geological ~tscov~~ies,
and no change in Gur economic policies, we would be out of
oil. Obviously, all these constraints have been ~ltered ~uring
the decade. Nevertheless, our reserve/ proQuction rAtio con-
tinues to drop. 011 reserves have remained relatively const~nt,
while demand has increased steadily. If the United states is
to maintain a reserve/production rati,) of 10/1, the "Jepartmp.nt
of the Interior forcasts that we will have a deficit of 4
billion barrels by 1980, and an 18 billion barrel 1efictt by
6
the year 2000.
In solving this deficit, the United States fqces ~ 1tle~mq.
The first possibility is that we can i~port the otl we need.
vihile the United Jtates has a reserve/productLm rA,ti') of 10/."
the world's is 50/1 and rapid discoveries are increasing th~t
margin. The second possibility is that the United States cqn
rely on domestic production by raising the price of crUQA oil
to the point where domestic product~oh becomeseconomi~~lly
justified. In a recent studY,rhe Petroleum Provinces 0f The
United Jtates, the National Petroleum Council has conclu1ed that
the potential petroleum resources of this country are 'm~ense.
Ahile many estimates have been made that are severql o~~e~s 0~
magnitUde apart, this study indicates that there 8re qhnut
720 billion barrels of oil in place, of which ,qhrmt 1 qo hi 11 ton
lie on the continental shelf. Other studies have indtcated that
up to 2 trillion barrels are loc~ed in oil shales, and another
400 billion in tar sands I AS3uming that we recover 50t o~ this
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potential oil in place, ~nd that our demand should Qnuble to
10 billion barrels a year, we still h~ve enough petroleu~ to
last at least 150 more years.
To summarize, then, the United St~tes f~ces no ~eal shortq~e
of Petroleum. The question revolves around how much we ~rp.
willing to pay in order to use our own reserves. 1n exq~tnt~~
the econo~ic policies the 30vernment has ad~pted for thp. pe-
troleum industry, it is important to View them in this context.
I have presented these policies in the chronolo~inql o~der 0~
their development, which is the reverse of thetr cost to the
consumer.
Government Policy and the 011 Industry
a.) Depletion Allowances
Depletion allowances were inacted because extractive indus-
tries use up their means of production in the ~rocess of nro-
duction. Depletion allowances qre different than denrectatt1n
allowances in that they bear no relation to the vRlue of th~
asset (the producing property), or to the expected lt~e o~ th~
asset. A producer may deduct the fUll vqlue of his denlet10n
allowance as long as he is prJducing oil.
Under current regulations, a producer ~ay deduct ??% of
his gross income as long as it does not exceed 50% of his
taxable income. Inpractice this has a~ounted to a tax saving
to the oil companies of 1,) billion dollars in recent years. 9
Additionally, oil companies may deduct intangible drilling costs
such as contractors fees and services. An examinAtion of oil
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company profits in 1969 reveals that Gulf Oil pqid O.9~ of
its profits in taxes. Texaco 2.4%. and Atlantlc Richfield
1.2'1>. 'I'he majors paid an averag e of 710 of their praft ts tn
taxes compared to 42% for all industrial corporations. 9
It is maintained that this tremendous tax advqnta~e is
necessary in order to reduce the risk qssociaten with exnloT-
ation of new oil fields. Since under existtng re~ul~t'_0ns,
an oil company may deduct ·ct d e pl eti on allowance on f01"'P' ~Y!
as well as domestic holdings. lt is q uea t t oriab'l e whether this
practice stimulates domestlc drilling as much qg it shouln.
It would certainly provide more of an incentive if it ~~re
applied exclusively to domestic holdings.
b.) Market Demand Prorationing
Pr-o r-a t t orn.ng is a system of restricting 011 nr-oduc t t on
in the Uni ted 3tates. ost~ibly to ins ure pr,yper coris e r-v« tt on
practices are enforced. Historically. these regulqttons ~Tew
out of the chaotic conditions which eXisted in the 0i1 innus-
try during the depression. The "rule of capture;" q lp~ql
princ~e developed by the courts, was interpr.eted to '1'\.e"m
that oil belopged to whoever brought it to the surface. ll..n
oil discovery quickly resulted in a frenzy of activity qimed at
bringing all the oil to the surface as fast as possible. F0r
geological reasons this created huge wastes. for the ultimqte
recovery of an oil field is inversely proportional to the
rate at which the 011 ls removed.
In practice. however. prorationing has become a prtce
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setting ~echan!s • ~ells r e not 1 ~~P.~ ta pro~ 10e t t hp'r
J xlmum physical efficiency , but ~ e resticte qr orn1n~ t
the demand for 011 .
~tates use m~r et d e m nd forc~ ts
en t of the Interior in o~der to cGlcul~te the r te of D~oructl ~n
that wil l 11 m t s i n the pr ice of oil . I TQ "I S t h s S rl-)np.
by the I'exaa rla11road Co l1 i s s i on . The O 'Tl'11 " . s t on s ts thp. nu,.,hq
of da y s ells cannot pr uce in the st~te . ~ nd then
each wel l an "allow ble , : ~h!ch 1s t h nu b er f ~~ys
<:ll1ts
can produce on t .e s res t 1. ted days . t nc e "8. r'")lflq, 1 E"S ' f'
base on such actor s depth, an wel s ng tthin
they have no relation to the capacity of VI 1 1 t o or-o .tuce ,
11s whi ch produce l e s than 0 b rels PQ d Y A po n t oro-
r ated a t all .
he theor of prorat onlng Can be 1 us t tAd by the
sup_ ly and de and curves shown abov • If p~utlt urn 'P t cp
per barrel were "2 .50 , then uan tty
To intaln thp. cu rent price of q,b?ut 3 .40 p.r
q uarrt I ty us t be curtailed to .' . 'I'he point is ,hqt R 1 nwA r- -
the
lng of / price 0 crude 0 1 does not r n ce th~ u nly . m h A
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shape of the supply curves nee~ to be conslnered to qp~rp.ct~te
t.n i s rac t , Oil production involves heavy Lnve s t.merrt in ftxerl
assets. but is characterized by low variable costs tn actu~l
+production. rhus in the absence of resrictlons. an efficient
producer can cover his fixed and variable costs. even ~ith a
price reduction, by simply pumping more oil. For thl~ reason
supply curve 3 1 tends to be elastic. In other words, a s~~ll
increase in price results in a large increase in output.
rhe inefficient producer. however, is unable to cove~
all his costs at a low price for cruQe oil bAcause his wells
lack the physical capacity to produce at higher ~utputs. ~hts
results in the more inelastic supply curve 8 2 " In thts ca8e,
restrictions have been placed on the efficient proQucers, so
increases in output are met by marginal operators who
can only operate at high crude oil prices. Tn effect. m~r~et
deill~nd prorationing legislates in!ficienCy into the 011 tn~ustry.
Prorationing also reduces the incentives to find high
capacity wellsslnce their production will be restricted. In-
stead, the emphasis is pl9.ced on deep wells, and low capacity
stripper or near stripper wells Nich have large "allowahlp.8."
In a study conducted in 1964, &delman calCUlated that 78~ of
the new wells drilled in Texas were superfluous. 10
'I'h e Federal government supports pr-or-a t t ont ng tn t'l>10 1~qyS.
rhe fi rs t is the Co'hallY nHot Oi lit Act, which pr-oh t bi ts 0'\. 1
produced in excess of a state quota from moving in interstate
c omm er-c e , 'I'he second 1s the policy of the government to "lpoly
an"allowable."based upon that of the adjacent state, to wells
on the outer continent~l shelf.
'---
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This lat~er policy has significance for the offshore
011 business. Offshore oil w~ hs:tve been dri:led into less
risky. and highly productive fields. For the r eas ona out it ned
above. these wells would remain an attractive invest~ent even
were
with a reduction in crude oil price. if there/no restrictions
on production. There is also no justification for prorati 0ning
on the grounds of conaervatnon , since the size ~nd "l'll,)unt of
control exercised on government leases precludes Door con8er1r~-
tion practices. Proof of this lies in tht=! f~ct t ha t Sqlifor,.,'_~
has no prorationing system at all. sinCA the productive C~P9C,tv
of the state can be entirely absorbed by the market ie~~ni for
oil.
c. The Mandatory Oil Inport ~uota
It can be readily seen that pror"itioning could not survive
if cheap foreign oil were allowed to flood U.S. mar~ets. It is
necessary to limit imports so domestic prices Can rise above
the world price.
The present quota system grew out of conditions that e~lsten
in the post-~orld War II oil industry. Beginin~ in t~e t=!~r]y
1950's. American oil companies made heavy invest~ents in the
Middle East. At this t i ae the world price c l.o s e Ly f011oT'1 i"'ri th",
GUlf coast price. consequently imports were s'!l~11. The tre~en-
does size and low cost of Middle Eastern reserves prevented
this condition from lasting. As foreign crude oil prices iropped
rapidly. imports shared a growing fraction of the dO'llestic mqr-
keto After the duez crises in 1956. domestic producers raised
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the price of crude oil 40 cents, ~nd M1d~lp 89stArn qnd
.s out.h Amer-i.can imports reached a level that the~ovPT'n'1lpnt
considered dangerous for national security. In 1957 a volun-
tary quota was adopted. However, because quotas were alloC'lten
on the basis of how much oil individual companies were i'1l'Oort-
ing prior to 1957, those companies with recent foreign invest-
ments were at a disadvantage. The failure of the voluntqTy
program lead President 2is cnhower to envoke the na t t.o ns L
security clause of the Trade Agreements Act, ~nd imuose q
Mandantory Oil I~port ~uota tn 1959. In part the pro~lq~qtton
read:
"The new program is designed to insure a s t.ab le heql.thy
industry in the United 3tates capable of exploring for
and developing new hemispere reserves to replace those
being depleted. 'I'he basis of the new program, 11 '-<e thqt
for the voluntary program, is the certified reqUirements
of our national securi ty which mak e i t necess~ry t:hqt we
preserve to the greatest extent possible a Vigorous healthy
~ petroleum industry in the United states." 11
The mandantory import quota is administered by the Denq,..t-
ment of Interior ~nd the Office of Emergency Prep~redness. With
the except i on of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Ls La.nd.s , the Un t t ed
States is diVided into five districts para.llelling those used
for oil and gasoline rationing in 'world -~'Jar II. QU()t~s q.re set
at 12.2% of the estimated production far a gtven year. However,
since the volume of imports is in ~qny cqses a pol' tical questton,
the Department of Interior has lowered its estl~ates of UT00UC-
tiun when they have been"t01 high."
~here are several exemptions from the quota. Mextco ts
granted an overland exemption, but negoti~tions With P8mex. the
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national oil company of I1exico, have resulted in 11 voluntf'lry
restriction on imports of 30,000 bar~els per d~y. A C~n~~l~n
overland exemption was cancelled by Presid~nt Nixon in 1970.
Add i, tionally, risidua,l oil is allowed t nto rli strt cts I thJ"'~UR;h
IV, and number 2 heating oil is a l'_owed into New Eng'_'lnd. j?
It is important to consider how import licenses ~re 9110-
cated since they represent a clear windfa11 to the refiner
who can obtaln one. Generally, licenses are al1oc8ted on thA
historical basis of what the company was importing prior to
the initiation of the voluntary quota. There is als0 a sliding
scale which allows the smaller refiner to import a gre9ter
amount of oil. While companies are not allowed to sell their
import licenses, they are allowed to trade them for 011. Sm~ll
ref1ners who are at some distance from a shipping port may
find it advantages to trade their licenses to 9. major cO"T\l)qny_
who, in turn, can import oil from one of its overseas 0o~r~tlons.
In several recent years the total amount of imports allowed
have not been used.
fa appreciate the effect of the quota on the do~estic
oil market it is necessary to compare the world .qnd domestic
prices for oil.
l'Uddle t:astern Louisiana Gulf C08st
Wellhead price
Freight
Gathering price
'rariff
Dockside Price
( Eas t Coas t )
$1.43
.74
.10
2.27
Source: The Q!l Imoort Question
--
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be
without the quota, U.cl. wellhead price would/equ~lto the
world dockside price less domestic freight ~nd g~therin~ chAr~p,s
or i1.68. (This represents what the price woul~ h~ve be~n in
1970) Put ure changes in the world lind domestic prt ce s d.epend
on several variables. Jorld freight rates will continue to gn
down with the advent of the new generation of supertqnkers,
but the OPEC may demand higher prices. Do~estic prices qre
likely to rise if we continue to rely on U.S. reserves.
It is difficult to measure the precise cost of the quot~
to the American economy. The Cabinet Task Force on 0\1 est'~~te~
that the cost of the quota to the consumer WqS 5 billion dollArs
13
in 1J69.-Yhis figure represents the difference betwean ~uy\ng
oil on the world market and the domestic rnar~et. Th~5 Bi'lion
dollars is essentially an oil company tax, which on a per c~pitq
basis is $2~.
The oil industry maintains that this money is returned to
the American pUblic in the form of stock diVidends, state t~xes,
royalies, and other payments. ,Jhile this is true, the income
redistribution is unequal. Revenues accrue to the five oil pro-
ducing states, resulting in the non producing states pAying ~
higher share of the cost of the quota. Rhode Island Pqys t)?
per capita and Vermont pays $45.1~oughlY 90% of the stock diVi-
dends are paid to 10% of the popUlation.
rhere are other economic costs qS well. ~ high price for
oil, maintained as it is by prorationing, allows inef~ictency
in the industry. Capital ~nd other resources qre attracted to the
industry that would not be employed without high prices. More
-13-
energy entensive techniques of product10n Rre not used.
The justiftcatlan for these econl~ic costs qndthe con-
tinuatlon of the quota falls into five general Cqteg0r~es:
national security, balance of paynents, the future world
price of oil, the loss of labor, and the need tl sti~ulqte
domestic exploration. Each of these arguments deserves cAreful
consideration.
rhe national_ security requirements of the United 3~atp.s
are the most frequently cited arguments, as well as the legql
justification for the quota. National security has basically
two components. The first is that we shoUld not hecome overly
dependent upon foreign sources that are located in pol~tic~lly
unstable areas. The second is the need for a secure supryly of
oil in case of an actual conflict. In discussibg'thts lqt,ter
requirement, it is necessary to conceptualize the types of
conflicts that might involve the United States.
The most likely conflict is the limlted, guerrilla war
such as we are now fighting in Viet Nam. A conflict of this
nature is not likely to produce a serious oil supply problem.
As evidence, over 90% of the oil used in Viet Nam comes from
the Persian Gulf states, even though they have repeatedly
15
objected to our policies. There Was also no supply problem
during the Korean War.
While a conventional, non-nuclear war such qS ~orld
War II is an unlikely event, there are several qlternattves
to having an import quota. Conversion from civilian to mtl_tt~ry
uses, stockpiling, and rationing are all possible. C~nadiq~
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Mexican, and other hemispheric reserv~s ~re easily ~s se~ur~
as our own reserves, yet thaey are restricted under th~ pr~s~nt
quota. It is also worth-while to observe th~t the concentratton
of refining and production facilities in this country ~qkes
them exc~llent: targets for sabotage and stratigic bombing.
Import quotas have done nothing to solve this problem.
If the United States becom~ involved in a nucle~r war,
oil will playa minute role. Since nuclear weapons qr~ likely
to be directed against population centers r~ther than industriql
complexes, there would be an excess capacity of oil production
after such a conflict.
lhe Six Day w'ar in the lIiIidtHe East in 1967 is 8, ~o,d
test of the effectivess of thelmport quota. For ten dqys q~~~r
the conflict all production from Middle S~stern 8nn Nnrth ~~ric~n
fields ceased, and normal production did not resume for three
months. The fact that U.S. producti~n incr~ased by 12~ is cl~tm~d
by the petroleum industry to be proof of the wisdom of main-
taining the quota. It is questionable whether U.S. oil did in
fact save the day for Eur~~and Japan. It should be noted that
the Middle East conflict was of short duration, occurred during
the summer months when there was a smaller d ema nd for oil, ~ "
that Iran did not go along with the boycot~ and an exc~ss t~nker
capacity existed that could bring the oil around th~ Cape of ~0od
Hope. If any of these fq.ctors had not been so after t he '.fidr'l1 e
East conflict, there would have been acute supply prob'.~ms.
It is also informative to loo~ at the bottlenecks that
developed ~s the IU.~. industry expanded production. Transnortatton
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~nd pipelines from Canada proved to be ina.deauqte since th~
quota had restricted Canadian i~ports. Reftntn~ ca~~ctty b~c~~~
the most important limiting factor. however. gnd it c~n be
shown that the quota Was responsible f0r this. The quot~. by
maintaining a high price for crude oil. reduces the mqrgtn be-
tween a refine~s costs and the price of the finished oils he
markets. A low price for crude oil increases the margtn ~nd
thus acts as an incentive for companies to become refiners.
~dditional refiners mean excess capacity which can be used in
an emergen4y. Since the major oil companies control both th~
refining and production phases of the oil business. high crude
oil prices have little effect on their business. The m~10rs
prefer high crude prices because it tends to drive out p0ten-
tial competitors.
To summarize. it is doubtful that the quot~ hgs been~br ~ill
be . necessary for our national security. By relying an 0ur 00mes-
tic reserves we are fastly deplet~rtg our own low C0st fuel
resources. If we imported oil and only relied on domestic r~serv~s
during an emergency. we could meet our national security objectives
at a fraction of the cost.
The second justification for the quota is that our balance
of payments deficit would grow if we i~ported our oil. Th~
Cabinet 'rask Force on Oil estimated that if the do~estic pr~ce
of oil were allowed to fall to $2.50 p~r barrel. 4?t of our otl
would be imported. and there would be a balanoe 0f payments
deficit of 1.3 billion dollars a year by 1980. However. thts
study does not consider that iddustries such as petrochemicals.
-16-
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which alone f' generated a budget surplus of 1.3 billi~n
dollars a year, would become more attractive on the int~r-
national market. Additionally, as capital would be diverted
away from the oil industry with lower crude prices, som~ of
this monRy would be invested in industries which ar~ n~t export-
ers. These effects must be considered in order to ~ake q compre-
hens i ve eval.uat i on of the true balance of payments deficit.
The third argument for th~ import quota is that the Untted
States can not be sure that the world price for oil will not
go up. The basis for this argument, which has been given ~ore
cDedence in recent months, is that an international cqrtel,
such as OPEC, will monopolize the world's reserves of netroleum
and force a price rise. This presupposes that there is gotng
to be close co-operation among all the producing states. ~tth
the current rate of exploration in the world, the number of
countries who will become petroleum exporters is rapidly in-
creasing. Control will prove to be difficult at best. In order
to raise the price for oil, world production of oil will hqve
to be restricted under some system of prorationing. The tempt~­
these
tion for individual countries to break / r-es t r t c t r ons T'1t 11
be strong. Furthermore, there is no international equiv~lent
n
of the Conally "Hot Oil" Act that lMll\;.l force com p'l t a no e ,
'rhe whole process of oil negotiation is going throu~h
a period of flux. In the past, a s~all number of oil comnanies
owned almost exclusively by the United States and Great Britqin,
have dealt with the oil producing states directly with no
consultation with the consuming states themselves. It is
-17-
impossible to believe that countries with pow~rful ~conomtc
sanctions, such as West Germany and Japan, will ~llow their
16
vital interests to be decided in this way in the future. Compqni~~
in the Middle East have already ~xpressed interest 1n havin~
other countries make investments in their operqti0ns simply to
share the risks. As OPEC runs into stiff bargaining pow~r, it
is questionable how far they can rais~ their prices.
A final c ons Ld er-a t Lon is that the U.S. price wo ut d remqtn
a ceiling that could not be exceed~d by t upo r t s , 1,,[1 thout nr-o-,
rationing, this price could be considerablY lower thqn that
now prevailing in domestic markets.
The fourth argument in favor of maintaing the quota is th9t
the domestic industry w'Juld be so crippled that there 1'1ould he
a massive loss of jobs. It is maintained that over t.2 million
17jobs would be directly affected. This is absolute nonsense. Tn
the first place, there would be no loss of jobs at all in the
refining and marketing sectors of the innustry. In fact these
sectors would actually be likely to grow, resulting in an tn-
crease in jobs. In the second place, the production sector of
the business, which would be adversly affected, lost over
1'150,000 job~ in the decade between 1959 and 1969. Pres~nt
employment in this sector is about 270,000. It is pointless
to argue that the American consumer should pay 5 billion dollars
a year in order to keep these people employed. Furth~r~ore.
it has been estimated that there would only be a 5t loss of
production without the import quota.
The final argument for the Mandantory Import Quota is th~t
10
9
B
6
5
4
~=~~--i~---~·-~·~~I=~dd_=~
. -I
-- Proved Heserves and Total Wells Drilled. Drilllng he-s dp.cl '-np-o ----1
. steadily since 1956. Proved reserves remained c o ns t.a nt; thr'lugh .1
most of the 60's with a slight decline ~t the end or th~ dec;de.-~~
--I~-Lr= -+I~=-T--j.-- l --- -- -i- --1= -~-~---t--.._--.- -----~i- .L L -l----·----r-----·~
--1---1 -- -- -,-I-- --f- +-1---
3
4
2
9
I
I
-- -------1- ---- --1----- J__ Proved Reserves in Tens of Bi11io~~----
-T--l I 1-----~~--1---t---t- ---j-~__1
--- l.'" ---1-- '-I- I
1----+
1
- - I I ----t-----~If-------1
---------- ----
.-f-------+------'--t---'----t---.,---+-------,.- ------f------
_.-... ----- -----_.- .-._-.- _._-.-._._--- -- -----. -------- ----.--- - -_.-- ---_.- -- - - --I- ------
8 r ---+-----j- ---
7-- -- '--x---'-- -------.- ---------- ---------- ,------- --- ---- -- ---- 1----' --
:===t~---t~~~-== _Tota~~~~D;1~e~~~~r_of_tTllSandS
--- --- -- -- j --- ----- -- -1-- --- ~-- - l
I I . ~o~;ce:~p.-~;:.:-um-.d.. ~1sures J 19j'3.. '
I I ll' -I - I T
l'94j 4C/ 50 5/ 5:2 5~ 54-- 55 d -57 tB $if k II ~~-~" 'IS
3
2
-18-
it is necessary in order to sti~ulate dnmestio ~ri'ling ~nd
exploration. A cursory glance at figure 1 will show that
domestic drilling h~s steadily declined in the UniteA St~t·s.
Since an adequate understanding of this also involves the
effectiveness of government policy, the two need to be consiry~r­
ed together.
Domestic and Offshore ~xploration- A Changing Pattern
To analyze the reduction in domestic drilling, the d~o~de
prior to 1956 needs to be examined. (see figure 2) Between
1946 and 1956 wildcat drilling tripled, increasing from 4,000
to 12,000 wells. At the same time, however, the size of the
crUde oil discovered per well dropped. The flv~ year ~verqge
discovery per well between 1946 and 1950 was 999 thousand
barrels per well. Betwe~n 1951 and 1955 the averRg~ ~iscovery
was 522 thousand barrels per well. By 1960 the avera~e discovery
per well had dropped to 315 thousand barrels per well. Obvi0usly,
the tremendous increase in exploratory drilling did not achieve
its objective of finding new reserves. Total drilling more
than doubled during the period from 1946 to 1956, reserves
increased by less than a third.
Not surprisingly, oil companies began to lose interest
in domestic exploration. Investors felt that all the lar~e,
easily accessable pools in the United States had been disc0vere~.
This attitude has manifested itself in two ways. ~irst, cqnlt~l
expenditures h~ve been shunted away from producti0n and directed
into different sectors of the bUsiness such as petrochemicals.
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In 1962, 73~ of all capital expenditures by oil co~p~nt~~
were for exploration and production, but by 1967 this hq1 ~~c'tned
to 56;1>.lJecondlY, oil conpam es have s augrrt less 'r t s ky !1r~qs
for development. In this context, offshore oil hee become .n
attractive investment. While drilling costs are ~uch higher
offshore, and increase rapidly with depth, Barrel yield per
foot drilled has been five times greater than onshore. A
combination of geological knowledge and a decade of technologic~l
advancement combined by the late 50'e to make offshore oil
an attractive investment. The disappointiftg_results onshore,
rather than the domestic price for oil, were re~pon~ible for
the rapid development of offshore oil production.
A comparison of the deflated "lverage wel1hean. pr-t oe of
crude oil and the rate of offshore development (figure 1) inn'\.-
cates that a declining price has caused no reduction in the l'!1te
of offshore development. In 1957 the average wellhead price
was e.12 a barrel. In 1968 the deflated price, bqsed on the
Jholesale Price Index,was $2.70 a barrel. Yet durin~ this period
offshore drilling quadrupled.
a
Not only has/~eeillining price of oil had little im~qct on
offshore
the/industry, but there is good eVidence that import quot"l~,
depletion allowances, and prorationing are unnecessary to
stimUlate development. Venezuela accounts for 47%, And the
Persian Gulf 30~ of <:111 the offshore l"1ells in the wor-Ld , arid
at wellhead prices that are in some casef'!l half the damestic
20
wellhead price. The offshore business is expandtng at 19% q
year worldWide, compared to 8% for onshore. The world price
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has acted as an adequate incentive for worldwide develoD'l1ent,
why is LtJnot adequate for the United States oil in~ustry?
An answer to this question leads to the ultimate contrq-
diction in U.S. oil polley. ImpJrt quotas and depletion al1ow-
ances are provided as incentives for domestic exploration, but
production is prohibited for environmental reasons. Decisions
to halt lease s a Les on the outer continental s hel f of Lout s t e ns ,
to prohibit further expansion of drilling in the Santa B~rb~ra
channel, and to hold up construction af the Alaska pipeline
are indicative of the contradiction in our poltcies. Thi~ i~
not to SUg6est that we should not ad"Jpt strict envtronment~l
laws, but it makes little sense to pr-ovI d.e incentives T'1hen w~
are not going to allow them to be used. Once again, it is thl'!
consumer who bears the ultimate cost.
Alternatives and Conclusions
"-
Given the excessive cost and poor performance o~ ~nvern-
ment incentives to the oil industry, it is neces~ary to con~t~e~
alternative policies. The Cabinet Task Force on oil ~ecomml'!n~e~
that a tariff substituted for the import quota. It was sttDll1a.terl
that the tariff would be gradually reduced a nrl frequent reVil"!T'l
would b e mandatory • The salient difference between a q u',t" l'lYlJi
a tariff is that revenues from imports QO not accrue to refine~~
lucky enough to get i'nport licenses, but t o the Federal Govern-
mente The Cabinet Task Force proposal did not consider the wisQom
of maintaining prorationing and depletion allowances.
'The best a L ternative to present government poll cy is
-21-
actually a potpourri of propos~ls. The first is stop pror~ttn~
efficient wells and allow supply and demand to determin~ th~
equilibrium market price. ·rhe second is to allow fr"'''' tr"lne
in oil, or at least free trade with Jestern Hemisphere c0untri~s.
the third is to stockpile oil in amounts sufficient to satl~fy
our needs during an emergency. Two econJm1sts qt the Untv..,r~1ty
"!sttmqt"!s
of V'iisconsin, rvIead and Sorensen, have cOllpleten q stuny thqtl
the price of storing a one years supply of oil qbov,,", ~rounn
21
to be abJut 2 bill16n dollars. More recentl_y,~"!st GermRny
has experimented with techniques of storing all in unn"!r~r,und
cavaties that has proved to be far che~per. The fourth 1s to
abolish depletion allowances, or at least to bring them into
line with other extractive industries, ~nd to 13.boltsh them
on foreign holdings. ~he fifth is that we should adopt environ-
mental laws that are consistant With our objective of finning
petroleum. The sixth, and last proposal, is that should the
rate of domestic exploration fall to what the ~ov""rnment considers
a dangero~level, then the goverment should ""ither dtrectly
SUbsidize exploration or else do its own. In this context it
is surprising to know that it was actually the U.S. Navy ,
not private industry, that discovered the trem""ndous oil
reserves on the North Slope of Al13.ska.
No attempt has been made to assess the pol1ttc~1 re13.11ty
of legis Lat Lng any of these proposals. I f the r-ec e pt ton of the
relatively mild Cabinet Task Force proposal is any tndicqtion,
opposition will be fierce. The arguments in their favor qre
true, this weakness not Withstanding. Import quotas, depletion
-22-
allowances. and market dem~nd pror~tianing h~v~ not met th~\r
stated obJ ect t v\"!s. It 1s time the A.merican cons umer- becS'lrne
aware of the costs of our present oil policy. and l'lh~t C9.n be
done to change it.
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